Conclusions
The practise of combination derivatives into complex financial products has shown that the risk on the balance sheet is only the tip of an iceberg of the actual combination of market, liquidity and credit risks that has been created (Rajan, 2005). One of the main issues with derivative financial products, such as CDO, CDS, inverse floaters and repos was that they were increasingly complex and opaque (Kolb, 2010; Valdez and Molyniux, 2010).
However, despite the complexity of derivatives, once measurements of risks are defined and correct oversight mechanisms put in place, derivatives on their own present no threat (Jorion, 1995). Al in all, even though Citron was not motivated by financial incentives and Orange County was not involved into the moral hazard in the same way as actors in the liquidity crisis; the insufficient risk management was the uniting problem for both crises.
Moreover, actions of both crises occurred within a particular setting. For instance, subprime lending triggered the liquidity crisis. The U.S. leaders, in turn, created the lax environment for the Orange County in response to the limitations that the county and local governments faced after Proposition 13 (Baldassare, 1998).
In the long run, even though mistakes in investing in derivatives had a big impact on the portfolio value and liquidity, the unwinding of both crises were still more related to the excessive leverage, lack of control, and relatively large holdings of securities (Jorion, 1995; Koselka and Munk, 1996; Marthinsen, 2009; Halstead, Hedge and Klein, 2004).
To sum up, according to Dunbar (2001), “market crises are not hurricanes, they are created by human behaviours”.
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